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DeveloDing  Countries,  The  World  Bank,  Washington,  D.C.I.  INTRODUCTION
The topic  of financial  taxation  in developing  countries  combines  issues
of growth,  public  finance  and  macroeconomics.  It is  of direct  relevance  for
countries  which  have  been subjected  at times  to  large  taxation  of financial
assets. These  experiences  were  a direct  consequence  of an internal
instability  of the  budget  and  the inability  of standard  taxes  to fulfill
budget  requirements.
The taxation  of  money  has attracted  a huge  number  of studies  which  have
mainly  concentrated  on the  episodes  of extremely  high inflation  rates  such  as
in  Latin  American  countries. In such  occurrences,  there  was a sharp
differentiation  between  the  various  types  of financial  assets. For  example,
the  hyperinflation  of  Germany  did  not affect  directly  the  taxation  of assets
traded  in the  stock  market.
The structure  of financial  markets  in  many developing  countries  is such
that  the  menu of financial  assets  is restricted  to  money  as broadly  defined.
Inflation  and  regulations  on the  financial  system  (such  as interest  ceilings,
or reserve  requirements),  have thus  a strong  impact  on  all financial  savings,
and  not  just on the  money  that is  used for  transaction.  The importance  of the
impact  on financial  intermediation  needs  hardly  to  be stressed  in  economic
development.
The impact  of financial  taxation  depends  very  much on the  stage  of
development. Tne  same  general  economic  principles  will  be at  work everywhere,
but the  emphasis  will depend  on the  context. Experiences  of financial-2-
liberalization  will  be different  in  Korea  and  Ghana. Most of the  empirical
material  of this  paper  is  drawn  from  Sub-Saharan  countries  where the  broad
definition of money encompasses most financial assets.  This  area has
attracted  less  attention  than  Latin  America  or some  Asian  countries. Yet it
offers  simple  and  interesting  case studies 1. We will see  that  financial
markets  are  not  as well  developed  in  Africa  as in  Latin  America  and  Asia,  and
that  lessons  for  policy  in  those  continents  do not  necessarily  apply  for  Sub-
Sahara  Africa.
The  tax base and the fiscal instruments are introduced in the first
section  of the  paper.  The  paper  deals  only  with implicit  taxes  (such  as
reserve  requirements)  which  dwarf  the  explicit  taxes  (such  as taxes  on
interest  incomes of financial institutions).
There  is a strong  distinction  between  tax  rates  and  cash-flows  of
revenues  to government. In order  to introduce  the  empirical  backgrount,  I
have chosen  to consider  first  the  tax  rates  that  are  the  consequences  of
regulations  and  inflation. The impact  of the  rate  of return  and the  level  of
financial  assets  is analyzed  in Section  III  both through  comparisons  across
countries  and through  time  series.
The issue  of revenue  measurement  is taken  up in Section  IV.  It includes
the  measurement  of seignorage. Perhaps  contrary  to common  opinion,  this
problem  is  not  simple. It  will  be shown  that  the  proper  base of computation
is often  closer  to  M2 than  to the  monetary  base.  Once the  base is
iThe  taxation  of financial  assets  in  Sub-Saharan  countries  has also  been
analyzed  in  Chamley  and  Honohan  [1990]. The  contents  of the  two  papers  are
somewhat  different.-3-
established,  the  computation  of revenues  still  raises  issues  which  are
considered  here.
The results  of section  III  and  IV are  used for  the  analysis  of the
efficiency  cost  of taxation  in Section  V.  This  cost  is found  to  be low  when
inflation  is low (less  than  25  percent),  and  very  high  when the  inflation  rate
is  moderate  (between  60 and  100  percent). These  costs  are  higher  than  those
that  can  be derived  from  other  studies  (which  have followaer  Cagan [1956]).
This is explained  by the  fact  that  the  taxation  of financial  assets  affected
financial  savings  (as  well  as transaction  balances)  which  are  respond
significantly  to large  rates  of taxes.
Most of the  analysis  of the  efficiency  cost  is restricted  to the  impact
on financial  assets  and  uses the  standard  tools  that  were  developed  by
Harberger  and  others. These  estimates  provide  a lower  bound  of the  costs.
Other  inefficiencies  cannot  be evaluated  at this  stage. However,  these  costs
seem  to come short  of the "linchpin"  effects  of some  theories  of development.
Since  this topic  may  be reNived  by new  models  of endogenous  growth,  Section  V
provides  also  a brief  discussion  of the  role  of financial  taxation  in this
context.
The final  section  concludes  with some  remarks  on financial
liberalization.
II.  FISCAL  INSTRUMENTS
The  Base
The  menu  of financial  assets  in  many developing  economies  includes
currency,  demand  and time  deposits,  end  in some  cases  deposits  are specialized-4-
institutions  such  as  merchant  banks  or  saving  institutions.  Stock  markets  are
embryonic  in  the  best  of  cases. Even  in  a  country  llke  Nigeria,  the  stock
market  is  very  thin  and  some  of  the  main  stocks  have  unchanged  price  quotes
for  weeks. Government  bonds,  which  could  provide  the  best  risk  guarantee  .,d
liquidity  are  not  owned  by  individuals.  As  a  matter  of  practical  purpose,
financial  institutions  are  the  -vain  holders  of  the  government  debt  (outside
the  Central  Bank). Therefore,  in  many  countries  of  low  to  middle  income,  and
especially  in  Sub-Sahar  Africa 2,  the  main  base  for  financial  taxation  is  the
extended  definition  of  money (K2).
Inastmenta
The  fiscal  instruments  are  divided  in  two  groups,  explicit  and  implicit
taxes.
Explicit  instruments  include  taxes  on loans,  interest  income,  VAT.  They
are  defined  by  statutory  rates  which  are  stable;  these  rates  are  not  immune  to
revisions,  but  not  more  frequently  than  otiaer  items  in  the  tax  code. The
statutory  rates  are  different  from  the  effective  rates,  mainly  because  of  a
lack  of  indexation  for  inflation.  Despite  such  shortcomings,  the  average
values  of  the  effective  rates  are  in  general  small  and  their  variations  are
dwarfed  by  those  of  the  implicit  taxes.
In  African  countries,  explicit  taxes  are  found  mainly  in  the  countries
that  have  inherited  a  tax  structure  from  France,  namely  Morocco,  Tunisia,  and
the  countries  of  the  two  CFA  zones.  Such  taxes  are  also  found  in  the
2The  stock  market  plays  an  important  role  in  a  number  of  developing
countries,  especially  in  Asia. Also,  private  individuals  own  government  bonds
in  these  courntries.Philippines.  They  are  inRignificant  in  the  other  African  countries  and  in
Latin  America.
Implicit  instruments  are  the  ralson  d'etru  of taxes  on financial  assets.
They  seem  to  provide  ready  source  of  cash  in  time  of  crisis  when  the  regular
3 means  of  taxation  are  failing  . By  definition  these  taxes  do  not  appear  in
standard  aiational  accounts  as  tax  revenues.  Their  effective  rates  are
difficult  to  compute,  highly  variable  and  often  cannot  be  predicted  ex  ante.
Implicit  taxes  have  been  very  large  at  times.  The  magnitude  of  their  revenues
has  exceeded  100  percent  of  the  tax  base  (per  annum)  in  qome  cases.  In  this
paper,  I  deal  exclusively  with  the  implicit  instruments.
A  brief  review  of  the  instruments  is  necessary  at  this  point. These  are
a)  the  issuance  of  currency  (seigniorage),
b)  reserve  requirements  (earning  below  market  rates),
c)  lending  targets  at  non-market  rates,
d)  the  combination  of  interest  ceilings  and  inflation.
a.  The issuance  of  now currency  debases  the  money that  is  already  in
circulation,  and  the  resulting  inflation  is  a tax  on  the  currency. This  tax
cannot  be  separated  from  the  taxes  on  the  institutAuns  of  financial
intermediation  because  these  institutions  provide  asset-  that  are  close
substitutes  for  the  currency.  An  essential  aspect  of  this  tax  is  that  it
operates  through  a capital  loss  on the  existing  currency. This  raises  some
issues  for  the  computation  of  revenues,  which  will  be  adressed  in  Section  IV.
b.  Reserve  requirements  that  earn  a  rate  below  the  market  are
equivalent  to  a  tax  on  deposits.  It  is  sometimes  argued  that  they  crowd  funds
3We  will  see  that  this  appearance  may  be  deceiving  when  the  tax  has  a
strong  impact  on the  level  of financial  assets,  and  that  high inflation  rates
may only  generate  if at all,  a small  increase  of revenue.-6-
out  of the  markets  for  private  credits. This is  correct,  but the  government
could  invest  the  proceeds  of the  reserves  into  investment  project  that  earn  a
return,  and  pay depositors.  Required  reserves  are  therefore  to  be viewed  as
an implicit  tax  with a rate  that  is equal  to the  difference  between  the  market
4 rate  and  the rate  paid on the  forced  borrowings
c.  Lending  targets  for  preferred  sectors  (typically  agriculture),  are  a
sort  of earmarked  reserve  requirements,  and are  equivalent  to a tax  on
deposits  which  subsidize  the lucky  borrowers  at preferential  rates.
d.  The  last instrument  on this  list  (ceilings  cum  inflation),  has  been
often  overlooked  although  it  has  been  one  of the  most important  tax  instrument
on financial  institutions.  An example  is provided  by the  case  of Nigeria
before  1986: All loans  were subject  to interest  ceilings  at less than  12
percent.  (Some  requihements  for  specific  sectors  with lower  rates,  had  also
to  be met).  Given  the  ceilings  on the  private  loans,  and  their  inherent
riskiness,  the  government  bonds  at a rate of 9 or 10  percent  were  very
competitive. It is therefore  no surprise  that  their  fraction  in  banks's
portfolios  was  well in  excess  of the  liquidity  requirements  (in  some  cases
more than 60  percent).
In order  to  highlight  the  effect  of interest  ceilings,  consider  the
stylized  case  a regime  with zero  values  for  interest  rates  on loans  and
4The only (possibly  minor)  difference,  is that  by altering  requirements
on forced  borrowings,  the  government  can  generate  a cash-flow,  for  a temporary
period,  which  exceeds  substantially  the  implicit  tax  that  is due  to interest
rate  differential. Such  a  policy  however,  does  not affect  the  present  value
of (implicit)  tax  revenues.-7-
deposits,  and  a high inflation 5. This  situation  is  well approximated  in some
cases:  for  example,  the  inflation  rate  in Somalia  was  higher  than  50 percent
in 1980,  when the  deposit  rate  was  constrained  at  a  value  of 7.5  percent. in
such a  regime,  financial  institutions  will  happily  buy government  bonds  that
pay  a rate of return  equal  to zero  since  th,ir  risk is less  than  that  of
private  bonds.  The  banks  are  not  forced  to hold  government  bonds,  and  Lhe
government  is thus  able  to  borrow  "competitively"  at no interest  all  the
resources  of the  financial  system,  if  necessary. In this  case,  the  regime
reproduces  thast  of a 100  percent  reserve  requirement. This  example
illustrates  the  overlap  between  different  the  economic  effects  of  various  the
fiscal  instruments,  thus  complicating  their  analysis  and the  measurement  of
revenues.
Note that  ceilings  on interest  rates  may  have been  left in  place  more  by
inertia  than  activist  policy  design. The  regular  course  of events  is that
ceilings  are in  place  because  of general  concerns  about  credit  markets  (sub-
Sahara  Africa),  usurary  laws (Thailand),  and other  factors. In  normal  times
the  ceilings  may  be binding,  but their  effect  is relatively  small 6. When a
fiscal  crisis  occurs,  inflation  rises,  the  reilings  are left  in  place,  and
their  impact  becomes  very signif'cant. The  ceilings  are  then  useful  for
government  finances. However  they  also  subsidize  private  loans,  thus imposing
a greater  burden  on depositors  per  unit of revenue  to the  government  than
taxes  on deposits  or reserve  requirements.
5The loan  and deposit  rate  are  assumed  to  be equal,  for  the  sake  of
simplicity. In this  stylized  example  there  is no operating  cost  of the
financial  instritutions.
6There  is always  the  well  known  escape  of the  compensating  balances.-8-
III. IMPACT  OF TAXATION  nN FINANCIAL  DEEPENING
III1.  Effects  of  Taxes  and  Revulatigns
The  discussion  of  financial  taxation  is  often  conf ing  eecause  of  the
multiplicity  of instruments,  which  are  intertwined  and  ssrve  similar  purposes.
Taxes  and  regulations  on  financial  institutions  need  to  be  analyzed  through
their  effect  on  incentives  and  credit  allocation.
The  main  impacts  of  the  fiscal  instruments  that  were  described  in  the
previous  paragraphs  are
- the  taxation  of  the  holders  of  financial  assets  through  a  lower  rate
of  return.  This  effect  operates  on  the  level  of  available  funds.
- the  allocation  of  the  available  funds  to  borrowers  through  price
incentives  and  rationirg.
Financial  institutions  are  by  definition  extremely  highly  leveraged.
Deposits  represent  more  than  90  percent  of  their  assets;  operating  costs  may
reach  6  or  7  percent  of  the  assets.  These  ratios  are  small  when  the  effective
tax  rate  on  assets  exceeds  30  or  even  100  percent.  Taxes  and  regulations  have
obviously  affected  the  profitability  of  banks 7, but  the  brunt  of  the  tax
burden  has  been  borne  by  depositors.
7In  Nigeria  banks  were  heavily  subsidized  between  1984  and  the  september
1986,  when  they  collected  interest-free  deposits  towards  import  licences,
which  they  were  allowed  to  invest  in  T-bill  earning  between  9  and  10  percent.-9-
III.  2.  IJ&a& n&&
The definition  and  measurement  of effective  tax  rates  is  relatively  easy
when compared  to the  determination  of revenues. The standard  method  is to
impute  values  for  real  interest  rates  on assets  that  would  prevail  in a  no-tax
equilibrium,  and  to define  the  effective  tax  rates  by the  gap  between _ctual
real  rates  and  no-tax  rates. The only  problem  here is the  difference  between
ex  ante  and  ex  post  values. The first  are  relevant  for incentive  effects,  but
in  most cases  we can  compute  only  the  second. The  evaluation  of this  issue
depends  on the  particular  context.  (We  will  encounter  the  same  situation  in
the  revenue  enalysis). When the  inflation  rate  is constant,  the  two  values
are  identical. In other  cases  there  ma-,  be some  discrepancy,  but I think  that
it does  not  present  too  much difficulty,  provided  that  one  is aware  of the
8 difference
III.3.  Efpirical  Evidence
III.3.a  Cross  Section  in  Sub-Sahara
The  standard  measure  of financial  deepening  for  developing  economies  is
defined  by the  ratio  between  money  broadly  defined  (usually  K2) and  nominal
GDP.  This is  a  crude  measure  since  it  aggregates  assets  that  serve  different
purposes  of transaction  and saving,  and  have different  inte1rtst  elasticities.
However,  as a first  approximation  it  has  been a useful  indicator. Cross-
sections  and  time  series  provide  two  types  of evidence  on the  relation  between
taxation  and the  level  of financial  assets.
8The  distinction  between  ex  ante  and  ex  post  is  essential  in  well
developed  asset  markets.-10-
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The sub-saharan  countries  form  a set  that  is sufficiently  homogenous
(compared  to other  samples),  for  comparisons  across  countries. We can  expect
that the  data  will show  a relation  between  the  level  of financial  deepening
and the  "inflation  environment"  in the  medium  term. Hence,  it is  more
relevant  to look  for  a relation  between  averages  of inflation  rates  and
averages  of M2 to  GDP ratios. This  data  is represented  in  Figure  la for
almost  all  sub-saharan  countries9.
The figure  presents  a striking  pattern: countries  can  be divided  in two
non  FA ad  CF 10
groups,  non  CFA and  CFA  ,  respectively.  All  non CFA  countries  are  found  near
a  schedule  that  shows  an inverse  relation  between  inflation  and financial
deepening. The  only exceptions  are  Rwanda,  Burundi,  and  Malawi,  which  have
low inflation  and  low  financial  deepening. This  apparent  anomaly  is  easily
explained  by differences  of urbanization  ratios. Whereas  all  the  other
countries  have ubanization  ratios  between  17 and  30  percentl  (except  for
Uganda,  with 7  percent),  the  urbanization  ratios  for  these  three  countries  are
2%, 2%  and 5%,  respectively.
The second  group  is formed  by the  CFA  countries: they  have experienced
low  inflation  on average,  (because  of the  institutional  restraints  on the
creation  of money),  but their  level  of financial  deepening  is lower  than in
9The  missing  countries  (among  the  reporting  members),  are  Ethiopia,
Madagascar,  Liberia,  and  some  of the  countries  in the  CFA  zones  that  would  be
redundant  with the  data  in the  Figure  (Burkina  Faso,  Chad,  Niger)
1OCFA  countries  belong  to one  of the  two  currency  zones  with a fixed
parity  with the  french  franc  (a  constant  nominal  exchange  rate  since  1953),
and  specific  constraints  on  monetary  policy,  (see  Honohan  [1990]).
l 1Word  Development  Report,  1988.-12-
0.6
0.5  - zwe
(1.09)  \
a Iso
0E  4  (1.41)
a ken
(0.98)  * tza
(0.69)  (0.41)w
0.3  --wa  mnga  zinb,m\  sdn




0.1  gzara  ug
(0.1  1)
0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8
aver.inflation  80.86 - a * nom.interest 80 86
a = average quasimoney/gdp 80-86.  (>)  average quasy money/money80-86.
FIGURE  lb-13-
the  non CFA  countries  with low  inflation 12. This difference  is  not explained
by the  urbanization  ratios,  which  are  not lower  than  average. One  possible
explanation  is  that the  special  monetary  system  facilitates  for  some  countries
a financial  intermediation  through  european  institutions.  This  issue  is
beyond  the  scope  of the  present  studyl3.
The representation  of the  data  is repeated  in  Figure  lb for the  sub-
sample  of non CPA  countries 14. The  Figure  shows  that  the  effect  of inflation
on the  level  of financial  assets  is  weak  when this  inflation  rate is less  than
20 percent  on average  (Botswana,  Nigeria,  Kenya,  Lesotho,  Zimbabwe). This
could  be explained  by fixed  costs  of substitution  between  financial  and  other
assets.
The inverse  relation  between  inflation  and  assets  is  strong  when the
inflation  rate  is in  the  range  of 30 to 60 percent  (on  average). The  ratios
between  quasi-money  (M2-M1),  and  money (Ml),  are  also  reported  for  each
country  in the  diagram. One can  observe  that  that  in this  range  of inflation
rates,  the taxation  of financial  assets  has a strong  impact  on the  level  of
quasi-money,  which  is  used  as means  of savings. The  ratio  of time  deposits  to
12The exception  is  Togo  with  an index  of financial  deepening  of 10  points
more than in the  all  the  other  CFA  countries; the  difference  is  probably  due
to the  inflow  of funds  from  neighboring  Ghana  where  inflation  exceed  100
percent  at the  same  time.
1 3It  is  noteworthy  that  in the  cases  of relatively  low  financial
deepening,  the  shortfall  of deposits  is compensated  by loans  from  the  Central
Bank  to commercial  banks,  such  that  the  credit  to GDP  ratio  in a country  such
as d'Ivoire  is  not  much different  from  say,  Kenya. The relatively  high
deposits  in Togo can  be explained  by a  substitution  from  the  highly  taxed
Ghana.
14An  adjustment  is  made  here  for the  interest  that  is  paid on time
deposits. This  adjustment  is  negligible  because  most interest  rates  were
fixed  during  the  period. This is  confirmed  by a  comparison  with Figure  la.-14-
money (demand  deposits  plus  currency  outside  banks)  is relatively  high for
countries  with low  inflation  (ratios  in  Kenya  and  Zimbabwe  are  near 100
percent),  and  low in the  countries  with  high inflation  such  as Ghana,  Zaire,
and  Uganda,  where it is less  than  30  percent.
The  strong  response  of broad  money  to  high inflation  is is an essential
aspect  of  the  taxation  of  money  (broadly  defined)  in  Sub-Sahara  Africa.  Broad
money  is  used  for  saving  purposes.  Numerous  studies  have  shown  that  this  type
of asset  is more  sensitive  to  rates  of return  than  money  that  is  used for
transactions.  Indeed  some  have argued  that  this  should  be taken  into  account
in the  design  of efficient  taxes  on financial  assets 15. They  were  by and
large  no such  differential  rates  for financial  assets  in Sub-Sahara  Africa
before  1986,  and  taxes  on assets  not used for  transaction,  when  high,  had a
large  impact  on their  level.
At the  other  end  of the  spectrum  of financial  assets,  other  data show
that the  impact  of inflation  on the  level  of currency  is  weaker,  and  becomes
significant  only  for  very  high inflation  rates  such  as in Ghana  between  1978
and  1983.
The implication  of this  situation  was that  the  high inflation  rates  did
not generate  large  increases  of revenues. The  measurement  of these  revenues
is a  complex  issue  which  will  be addressed  in the  next  section,  but we can
take  here an approximation  which  multiplies  the  base  by the inflation  rate
minus  a correction  for  the  handling  of the  accounts  (which  is fixed
arbitrarily  at 5 percent 16).  The locus  of points  .- here revenues  are  equal  to
15See  Fry [1981].
16Such  choice  is  not  critical.-15-
6 percent  of GDP  is represented  by the  curve  r.  One  can  verify  that  it fits
rather  well the  data for  the  countries  with  high inflation. This fit  is not  a
strong  proof  that  high inflation  does  not  bring  more revenues. But it is an
indication  that  the  increase  of revenue  is  not large. In the  range  of 30 to
60  percent,  an increase  of the  inflation  rate  does  not generate  on average,
much  higher  levels  of revenues. It is  however,  quite  possible  that  very  high
inflation  rates  generate  large  revenues  for  short  periods. This evidence  will
be compared  with the time  series  data.
III.3.b  Time  Series: High Inflation  in Sub-Sahara
I  now turn  to the  four  countries  that  have  experienced  the  higher  levels
of taxation  on financial  assets  in  sub-sahara  Africa,  which  are  by increasing
order,  Somalia,  Ghana,  Zaire  (see  Figure  la) 17. These  are  the  countries  where
one  can  expect  the  most  significant  impact  of taxation  on financial
intermediation  and  on financial  deepening. The evolution  of inflation  and the
monetary  aggregates  in  represented  in Figures  2a to 2c.
The response  of the  level  of assets  is  measured  through  the  estimation  of
an error  correction  model 18.
Demands  for  Financial  Assets
The  error  correction  model  is composed  of two  equations  of the  form
17The  data for  Uganda  was too  poor to  be usable  at this  stage.
180rdinary  least  squares  equations  with lagged  dependent  variables
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(1)  Lm  - C1 +  ar +  Y  +  ,  with the  notation
M is the  financial  assets,
In  - Log(M/P), P is a  price  index  (CPI),
Y  - Log(y),  y  - Real GDP,
ff  is  t..  inflation  rate
e  i.  the  residual  of  the  estimation,
(2)  DLm  - C2 +  aDY + b0Dw +  b1Df_1  + cDLmfl  + 6e +  ,
with  the  notation
DLmm  Lm - Lm+l,
e is the  same  residual  as in equation  (1),  and f  is the
residual  of the  estimation  of the  second  equation.
The fin.Ancial  asset  M, was  chosen  to  be M2.  The  results  of the
estimation  (  .th  intrumental  variables)  for  Somalia  and  Zaire  are  presented  in
Table  1.  The case  of Ghana  is  more complex  because  of the  numerous  changes  of
policy  regimes  and  two  episodes  of demonetizations  that  cannot  easily  be
captured  by standard  equations. A more in depth  analysis  is  presented  by
Tsikata  [1990]. During  the  periods  of estimtitn,  the  interest  rate  on time
deposits  was fixed. We can  therefore  equate  the  tax  on financial  assets  to
inflation. All  equations  show  a significant  inverse  relation  between  the
level  of  M2 and inflation.
Inspection  of Figures  2a-c  shows  a  moderate  impact  of inflation  on time
deposits  for  the  three  countries. This is  confirmed  by empirical  estimations.
This does  not contradict  the  cross-section  evidence  in Figure  1  which  showed  a-20-
large  development  of quasi-money  in low  inflation  countries. The  high levels
of taxation  in the  three  co.ntries  of the  sample  have  prevented  the  growth  of
time  deposits. This  effect  cannot  be detected  in the  time  series  data.  This
is  another  illustration  of the  difficulty  in  using  econometric  models  in the
evaluation  of policy  impacts  for  countries  that in regimes  of transition.-21-
TABLE  1
Demands  for  Finanial  Aa&egs
eel  uai
Somalia  Zaire










c  .88  .23
(3.2)  (.83)
6  -.49  -.35
(2.6)  (1.84)
R2  .62  .58
III.3.c. Moderate  Inflatin in Sub-SahAr
The case  of country  that  has  experienced  episodes  of moderately  high
inflation  is found  in  Nigeria. The  time  series  data is  represented  in Figure-22-
2d,  where  a relation  between  asset  levels  and  inflation  is  hard to  detect. No
such  relation  was found  to  be significant  in the  estimation  of an error
correction  model. This  evidence  is in agreement  with the  cross-section
results  of the  previous  section.
IV.  MEASUREMENTS  OF REVENUES
IV.  R1evenues  and  TAx  RAtes
Financial  taxes  are  often  used  by fiscal  authorities  when other  taxes  are
failing  (because  of administrative  costs,  or  macro-economic  fluctuations).
The  main  advantage  of such  taxes  is the  immediate  cash-flow  through  the
issuance  of currency  or debt.  However,  the  tax  impact  on individual  wealth
operates  through  the  capital  value  of the  financial  assets. This distinction
is essential  for  any  discussion  of revenues.
Consider  the  simple  case  of seignorage: the  government  does  not  tax the
currency. This  is  administratively  expensive,  a'nd  if it  were feasible,  there
would  be some  other  tax  with  a lower  administrative  cost.  The government
obtains  revenues  by issuing  new  currency  whic.a  is  equivalent  to the "old"
currency,  and  thus  reduces  its  value  through  inflation. Individuals  are  taxed
only  when inflation  occurs.
In a steady  state,  the  rate  of growth  of money  and the  the  inflation  rate
are  constant,  the  velocity  of money  is  constant,  and the  economic  analysis  is
straightforward.  However,  this  situation  is hardly  relevant  for  most
countries,  since  the  inflation  tax  is used  as a last  resort  in  a financial
crisis. When inflation  increases,  the  velocity  of  money  decreases,  the  rate
of inflation  exc'eds  the  rate  of  money  creation  and  the  measurement  of taxrevenues  by the  product  of inflation  and  the  tax  base exceeds  the  amount  of
actual  revenues. The  process  is reversed  when the  rate  of  money  creation
slows  down. When the issuance  of money  is  highly  variable,  there  is  no close
relation  between  the  cash-flow  of revenues  through  money  creation  and the
inflation  rate.
The  relation  between  money  creation  and  inflation  is in fact  more complex
because  of expectations  about  future  expansions.  The  most striking
illustration  has been  provided  by Sargent  and  Wallace: a  reduction  of the
rate  of growth  of  money  may generate  a  simultaneous  increase  of the  inflation
rate  because  of  private  expectations  that  the  temporary  short-fall  of revenues
will  force  higher  rates  of  money  expansion  and  inflation  in  the future. In
general,  the  anticipation  of  high  money  growth  in  the  futdre  leads  to an
increase  of the  price  level  before  the  actual  expansion. This  induces  a
capital  loss  on current  money  holdings  that  does  not  generate  any  revenue  for
the  government.
The  problem  of revenue  measurement  is  not  restricted  to seignorage  but it
is an inherent  feature  of the  taxation  of financial  assets. The  timing  of the
price  variations  of the  financial  assets  differs  from  that  of the  cash-flow,
and  depends  on the  type  of  policy  and  the  sophistication  of agents  in
financial  markets.
IV.2.  Methodology
There  is  no computation  method  that  yields  a reliable  measure  of revenues
in all  cases.  I  review  the  two  main ones:-24-
Method  1 (rate  of return)
In this method various  financial assets (currency, demand deposits, time
deposits)  are imputed  with real  rates  of return  which  would  prevail  in an
economy  without  financial  taxation. The  wedge  between  the  imputed  and  the
actual  rate  of return  defines  the  effective  ex  post  tax  rate,  and  the  implicit
revenues  are  defined  by the  product  of this  rate  with the  level  of  the  asset.
The  procedure  is thus  based  on the  computation  of the  effective  rates  of
taxation. When the  inflation  rate  is  high,  the  choice  of these  values,  which
is always  a little  arbitrary,  is  not  critical  for  the  computation. There  are
two  problems  with this  method:
(i)  The  discussion  in the  previous  bection  showed  that  this  measure  may
lead  to incorrect  results,  even  with perfect  day  to day  data.  This is the
reason  why seigniorage  revenues  are  not  computed  in  this  way.  In this  respect
the  method  generates  poor (good)  results  when the  inflation  rate  is  highly
variable  (steady).
(ii)  The  method  may introduce  serious  errors  with the  available  data,
which is  often  computed  on an annual  basis.  These  will  be examined  through
numerical  comparisons  with the  second  method.
Method  2 (cash-flow)
This  procedure  computes  the  cash-flow  that  is generated  by the  expansion
of assets  for  the  government  and  other  beneficiaries  of financial  regulations.
It  performs  well  with annual  data,  under  some  conditions. In some  other
situations  (such  as financial  deepening  with low  inflation),  it  performs
poorly. The  most  straightforward  application  of this  method  is in the
computation  of seignorage  revenues.-25-
Selgnlorage
The cash-flow  that is generated  by an  expansion  of the  monetary  base dH
is  equal
(3)  R  dM
If the  data on dM and  P  were available  at e-ery  instant,  the  computation
of revenues  would  be easy. However,  the  values  of dM and  P are  reported  only
at discrete  times. Moreover,  the  price  index  (often  the  CPI)  may not  be
reflect  the  composition  of government  expenditures.
For  this  reason,  most  people  use  a measure  such  as in Fischer  (1982],
where  the  amount  of revenues  is  estimated  by the  formula:
(4)  R  - AM
The  term  AM is the  increment  over  a  discrete  period,  and  Y  is the  value
of  nominal  GDP  over  the  same  period. The  value  of R' measures  the  ratio  of
real  income  from  money  creation  ovet  the  real  value  of GDP  for the  period.
For  most  developing  countries  the  minimum  period  for  the  computation  of GDP  is
one  year.  This formula  uses standard  national  income  data  with  no price  index
or deflator  to  produce  a  measure  of real  income  and is thus  very  convenient.
It gives  an exact  measure  of real  income  when
- the  velocity  of  money  is constant,  and
- the  rate  of growth  of money  are  constant-26-
during  the  period  (one  year).
However,  when one  of these  two  conditions  is  not  satisfied,  the  formula
is subject  to errors. These  are  analyzed  in  Appendix  1,  where it is  shown
that  the  bias  may exceed  20 percent  for  some  parameters. Methods  1  and  2 are
compared  in  a synthetic  example  in  Table  2 of the  Appendix,  where  the  money
expansion  is  not  uniform  during  the  year,  and takes  place  entirely  in the
second  half of the  year.  The  velocity  of money  increases  by various  amounts
during  this  period  of six  months  (as  one  would  expect). One can  see  that  the
Method  1 leads  to gross  overestimates  and is  not  appropriate  in this  case.
Other  Flnancial  Assets
We have seen  that  reserve  requirements  are  equivalent  to  a tax  on demand
and  time  deposits. These  are  included  in the  base for  the  seigniorage
revenues  in  formulae  (3)  and (4). However,  the  combination  of low  ceilings  on
nominal  interest  rates,  high inflation  and government  borrowings  (at  the  so-
called  "market  rate")  has the  same  effect  for  government  revenues  (with  an
additional  rationing  on private  credit  markets). Should  then  one include  the
expansion  of the  government  debt  in the  term  AM ?  This  correction  is  not  even
sufficient  when credits  to the  private  sector  finance  the  arrears  of the
government  (as  it occurred  in  Nigeria). Is the  expansion  of M2 a better
measure  for  revenues  ?  This  would  probably  be a good  procedure  when interest
ceilings  are  near zero  and inflation  is  very  high,  but it is totally
inappropriate  when inflation  is low,  interest  rates  are slightly  below  zero,
and  financial  assets  grow  because  of  a surge  of the  saving  rate  or financial
deepening.TABLE  3O
MEASUREMENTS  OF  TAX  REVEMLS
...  ...  ...........  ....................... ,  ,................................................................................................... 
.............  ....
1971 1972 1973 1974 17  1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1962 1983 1984 1965  1986 AVERAS
......................  ................................................  ....  .......  ..............  ...............................  ...........................  ...................................................  .....................
GHANA
v21w#  0.180  0.202  0.20B  0.192  0.226  0.251  0.221  0.194  0.196  0.162  0.137  0.155  0.097  0.097  0.114  0.113  MA intl  0.095  0.100  0.176  0.181  0.298  0.560  1.16 0.731  0.54 0.500  1.164  0.222  1.228  0.396  0.103  0.245  0.630 Tax  rat.  0.064  0.067  0.136  0.140  0.236  0.426  0.764  0.531  0.414  0.383  0.759  0.175  0.M  0.310  0.071  0.18?  0.438
n2  0.014 0.062 0.030 0.040 0.066  0.073 0.097 0.094  0.024 0.042  0.052 0.028  0.030 0.038 0.039 0.040  0.048
""1  0.011 0.013  0.028 0.027 0.053  0.10? 0.169  0.103 0.061 0.062  0.104 0.02T  0.076 0.030 0.008 0.021  0.066
Inft.  (sfx  yers  am.  *v.)  0.235  0.413 0.IS  0.50  0.633 0.7  0.721  0.732 0.676 0.602  0.S60  0.621
NW  (sIx  years  y.)  0.047 0.061 0.067 0.066 0.066 0.064 0.056 0.045 0.036 0.038 0.m  0.054
No1 (six  years w.)  0.040  0.066  0.081  0.090 0.096  0.10  0.0  9  0.075  0.063  0.051  0.044  0.076
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1960 1961 10  1M  1964 190  196  AVRAGS
..........  ...................  __..........................................................................................................................................................................................
SOW  IA
02/gi  0.189  0.165 0.222 0.235 0.1"  0.221 0.222  0.228 0.247 0.2m 0.176 0.16  0.151 0.099 0.111  0.123  MA
IntI  -0.00  -0.02  0.065  0.112  0.193  0.141 0.105 0.099  0.242  0.58  0.44  0.236 0.359 0.911  0.377 0.357  OM
No.2  -0.03 0.045 0.034 0.058 0.047 0.W  0.054 0.062 0.076 0.04  0.045 0.021 0.008 0.021 0.060 0.031  0.043
Tax ate  -0.00  -0.03 0.059 0.163  0.170 0.125  0.094 0.089 0.211 0.459 0.360  0.19  0.290 0.637 0.21  0.268  0.290
Mai1  -0.00  -0.00 0.013  0.038 0.033 0.02  0.021 0.020 0.052 0.128 0.063 0.032 0.043 0.063 0.032 0.033  0.049
InflatIf  (am.)  0.01  0.109 0.131 0.160 0.M23  0.270.26O  0.8  0.63  0.486 0."?  0.29
No.2 (wa.)  0.031 0.046 0.049 0.056 0.054 0.054 0.051 0.043 0.036 0.034 0.031  0.045
pal  (am.)  0.017  0.021  0.025 0.032  0.047  0.052  0.053  0.056  0.064  0.060  0.064  0.045TABLE  3b
NEASURENENTS  OF  TAX  REVENUES  (continued)
.........  ...............  .................................  ...  ......................  .............................................  ...........
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1962 1963 1964 1985 1986 AVAES ....  ..........  .....  .........  ..........................................  ................................................................................ 
.. .
ZAtRE
NZI0DP  0.209 0.220  0.215 0.238 0.273 0.228  0.248 0.280 0.171  0.149 0.168 0.209  0.184 0.162 0.146 0.154  A inflI  0.057 0.157  0.1% 0.274 0.290  0.806  0.690 0.484 1.086  0.420 0.349 0.362  0.71  0.522  0.238 0.444  0.536 DO.2  0.014 0.041  0.066 0.064 0.023 0.071  0.111 0.117 0.006  0.070 0.068 0.106  0.068 0.051  0.036 0.068  0.072 Tax  rate  0.049  0.139 0.136 0.232 0.246  0.591 0.523 0.391 0.738  0.345 0.294  0.302 0.568  0.415 0.203 0.359  0.414 NeSI  0.010  0.030 0.029 0.055 0.067 0.135 0.130 0.109  0.126 0.051 0.049  0.063 0.104  0.067 0.029 0.055  0.075





1971  1972  1973 1974 1975  1976 1977 1978  1979  1960 1981  1962  1963 1964  1  1966 AVERE .....  ...............................  ...................................  .............  ............................  ...  .. ,___............___
ZAIIA
NV610P  0.215 0.244 0.236  0.225-'0.295 0.294 0.332 0.297 0.276 0.283 0.270 0.318 0.330 0.320 0.269 0.237  IU tnf  0.060 0.050 0.064 0.080 0.101 0.187 0.197 0.163 0.096 0.117 0.139 0.124 0.196 0.200 0.374 0.516  0.212 No.2  -0.03 0.013 0.040 0.012 0.029 0.063 0.029 -0.03  0.065 0.016 0.013 0.083 0.03  0.038 0.03? 0.133  0.040 Tax  rate  0.043 0.034 0.047 0.062 0.082 0.154 0.156 0.126  0.066 0.082 0.105 0.090 0.147 0.146  0.251 0.!44  0.151 Mal  0.012 0.008 0.011 0.014 0.024 0.045 0.051  0.037 0.018 0.023 0.028 0.020 0.0OU  0.046 0.067 0.081  0.043
InftetIn  (aver.)  0.090 0.113 0.132 0.138 0.14  0.150 0.140 0.139 0.145 0.192 0.258  0.15S Nea2  5ever.)  0.020 0.031 0.023 0.027 0.028 0.025 0.029 0.028 0.040  0.035 0.055  0.032 NeMl  (er.)  0.019  0.025  0.030  0.031  0.033  0.034  0.031  0.030  0.032  0.040  0.050  0.04
0 efunforage  -0.04 0.012  0.020 -0.00 0.034 0.025 -0.00 0.005 0.004 0.011 0.013  0.014 0.012 0.015  0.016 0.083  0.017 Seigniorag (wr.)  0.007 0.014 0.013 0.010 0.013 0.009 0.007 0.010 0.012 0.014 0.026  0.013-29-
The computations  are even  more complicated  when the  debt  pays  an interest
that is  positive,  but below  the  market.  These  issues  are ignored  in  most
studies  that  compute  seignorage  revenues. For  some  countries  that  rely  only
on reserve  requirements  and  market  interest  rates,  the  standard  measure  is
appropriate  (subject  to the  errors  mentionned  above). In Sub-Sahara,  and in
other  countries  where interest  rates  have  been  regulated  in an inflationary
environment,  measurement  problems  cannot  be ignored.
IV.3.  Examnles
The evaluati i  of computation  procedures  depends  on the  policy  background
of the  countries. Information  on inflation,  and the  levels  of money (Ml  and
M12)  for  the  three  countries  was  summarized  in  Figures  2a,  2b  and 2c.  Various
measures  of computation  are  presented  for  ths  three  countries  of the  sample  in
Tables  3a  and 3b,  which  also include  the  measurements  for  Zambia,  and  Figures
3a to  c.  The results  illustrate  some  of thb  remarks  in the  methodological
discussion.
Consider  the  case  of  Ghana  first. The  first  period  of  high financial
taxation  occurred  in 1976-1977,  with inflation  rates  of 56 and  116  percent,
respectively  (Table  3a). The revenue  from  the  tax  according  to  Method  1, are
equal  to 10.7  and 16.9  percent  of  GDP for  the  same  years. Now consider  the
cash-flow  method  (method  2),  and include  the  entire  expansion  of  M2 in the
cash-flow  (which  is  an upperbound  of the  revenues). This  yields  to revenues
of 7.3  and  9.7  percent  of GDP.  Furthermore,  these  numbers  may already  be
overestimates  since  the  velocity  of money  accelerated  in that  period  (see  the
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FIGURE  3c-33-
also  be compared  for  the  entire  period  1971  to 1987:  method  1  yields  an
average  amount  of 7.6  percent  of GDP,  which is  almost  the  double  of the  second
estimate  of 4.2  percentl9. This is  not  surprising  in  view of the  large
fluctuations  of the inflation  rate  and  the increase  of the  velocity  of  money.
The  case of Somalia  (Table  3b)  presents  similar  properties. Inflation
began  to increase  in 1979 (22%),  peaked  in 1980 (47%),  and  was still  high in
1981 (37%). The ex  post  loss  of income  on financial  assets  as computed  with
method  1,  were equal  to 5.2 ,  12.Q,  and  6.3  percent  of GDP,  respectively. For
the  same  years  the  method  2  yields  the  values  of 7.6,  4.8  and  4.5  percent. In
both cases,  we see  that  the  first  methods  overstates  the  variations  of
revenues. The two  methods  yield  averages  for  1971-1987  in Somalia,  that  are
equal  to 4.9  and  4.3  percent  of  GDP.  Note  however,  that  method  2,  which
includes  all  of K2,  may  be an overstimate  of the  true  revenue. This
overestimation  is  especially  relevant  before  1980,  which  is a  period  of
financial  deepening  with relatively  low  taxati(a. For those  years  the  result
of the  first  procedure  is lower  than  that  of the  second,  sometimes  by 4
percentage  points.
These  examples  can  be repeated  for  other  cases  (Zaire  in  1976,  Table  3c)
V.  EFFICIENCY  COST  OF TAXATION
The  most important  distortions  of taxation  and regulations  on financial
institutions  concern  the  level  of deposits  and the  allocation  of the  available
19An  accurate  accounting  would  add  to both  results  the  revenues  from  the







funds  in credit  markets. Regulations  do affect  the  efficiency  of the
operations  of financial  institutions.  However,  as was  pointed  at before,  the
variations  of the  banks'  margins  of operating  costs  (less  than 5  percent  of
the  deposits)  are small  with respect  to these  two  effects  (when  the  effective
tax  rate  is greater  than  50  percent).
There  are four  types  of efficiency  costs  in the  taxation  of financial
assets,  as implemented  in developing  economies,  (i)  the  reduction  of the  level
of financial  assets  in the  formal  sector  and  the  substitution  towards  other
markets  (informal,  foreign),  (ii)  distortions  in the  allocation  of the
available  assets  because  of regulations  such  as interest  ceilings,  (iii)
interactions  between  taxes  and  existing  imperfections  in  the  credit  markets,
(iv)  the  impact  on the  level  of saving  and the  intertemporal  allocation  of
resources.
For the  first  three  types,  the  level  of total  capital  is  fixed. This  is
the  situation  of a static  economy  or an economy  on a  growth  path (which  may  be
balanced),  with an exogenous  capital  accumulation.  We will see  that  the  first
source  of distortion  is sufficient  is  many cases  to show  that  the  efficient
cost  is  very  high compared  to the  revenues  collected,  and  probably  higi'er  than
the  cost  of standard  taxes  for  many  countries. Even  when the  first  source  of
distortion  is small  (i.e.,  when the  supply  of financial  assets  is relatively
inelastic),  the  costs  of the  next two  types  can  also  be substantial.
The efficiency  cost  of the  last  type is  a  little  more controversial. In
any  case,  its  mechanism  is  very different  because  it  works  through  the  impact
on capital  accumulation  and  the  effect  of capital  accumulation  on growth. Its
analysis  deserves  separate  consideration.-36-
V.1.  Efficiency  Cost  in A Static  Econony  (or  on An exQonu  bala
V.1.a.  Taxation
In the  simple  model  of analysis  (Figure  4), the  demand  schedule  depends
on the  marginal  productivity  of investment  and  the  supply  schedule  depends  on
the  alternative  uses of funds  for  depositors. These  uses  may include
consumption  (in  particular  of durables),  foreign  or informal  capital  markets.
Note ti  .'  e  may  be some  interaction  between  the  demand  and the  supply
schedu:&  . nds are  reallocated  from  banks  to the  informal  market,  the
demand  for  loans  in the  formal  market  may decrea.e.
A tax  on deposits  or loans  introduces  a  wedge  between  the  lending  and ths
deposit  rate.  This  wedge  creates  an efficiency  cost  that is  measured  by the
area  of the  Harberger  triangle. A nice  property  of the  analysis  is that it
requires  only information  on the  elasticities  of the  demand  and  the  supply  of
funds. This  point  should  be stressed:  no description  of the  alternative  uses
of funds  (informal  market,  consumption,  of others)  is  necessary,  provided  that
there  are  no distortion  on these  markets,  i.e.  when there  are  no special
motives  for  policy  intervention  in these  different  activities. These
activities  may  present  some inefficiencies  when compared  to intermediation  in
the  formal  market. But  they  coexist  with the  formal  financial  market  and
present  possibilities  for  economic  substitution  because  some  or their
inefficiencies  are  compensated  by advantages.  As an example,  informal  credit
market  may  offer  less  risk  diversification,  but they  provide  some  special
relation  between  lender  and  borrower  which  improves  the  monitoring  capability.-37-
This  application  of the  standard  tool  of excess-burden  also  accomodates
the interaction  between  the  demand  and the  supply  schedules:  the demand  and
supply  function  do not  depend  only  on the  rate  of return,  ceterls  paribus.  As
the  tax  reduces  the  rate  of return  on deposits  in  the formal  market,  the
substitution  towards  the  informal  sector  reduces  the  demand  for  loans  in the
informal  sector. The  effect  of this  interaction  is a flatter  demand  schedule
for  loans,  in comparison  the  schedule  ceterls  parlbus.  The  efficiency  cost  of
the  tax  is  measured  by the  observed  changes  of demand  and supply  that  are
induced  by the  tax.
A lower  bound  of the  efficiency  cost is  given  by the  Xrea  of the  triangle
ABC  which is  equal  to
E  (1/2)ArAD
where  Ar and  AD are  the  reduction  of the interest  rate  and  of the  level
of deposit,  respectively,  which  are induced  by the  tax.  This  expression  is
useful  for  two  reasons:  first,  there  is  often  little  information  on the
interest  elasticity  of the  demand  for  loans. Second,  in  some important  cases,
this  expression  is likely  to capture  most  of the  efficiency  cost.  To see
this,  the  expression  of E can  be rewritten:
E  - (1/2)(r*-r)AD,
where  r* and r are  the  real  rates  of return  with  no tax  and  with  a tax,
respectively.-38-
The  amount  of  the  underestimation  is  equal  to
A  - (l/2)(rl-r*)AD,
where  r,  is the  marginal  productivity  of investment when the  tax  is in
place.  When  the  effective  tax  wedge  is  large,  the  value  of  the  real  not  rate
r  is  negative,  large  in  absolute  terms,  and  the  term  interest  gap  r*-r  is
probably  larger  than  the  difference  rl-r*.
Marginal  Efficiency  Cost
The  Harberger  formula  shows  that  the  efficiency  cost  is  of  the  second
order  with  respect  to  the  tax  rate,  and  therefore  with  respect  to  the  amount
of  tax  revenue.  However,  since  the  average  efficiency  cost  increases  linearly
with  the  tax  rate,  the  value  of  the  marginal  cost  increases  with  the  tax
wedge,  and  may  reach  levels  that  are  significant.  Consider  a  small  change  of
the  net  ra-te  of  return  of  financial  assets,  which  has  an  impact  dD  on  the
level. The  marginal  effciency  cost is  equal  to
MEB  - (r*  - r)dD.
Revenues  (implicit  of  explicit)  are  equal  to  (r*  - r)D,  and  the  marginal
changu  of  revenues  is  equal  to
dR  - (r*  - r)dD  - Ddr.-39-
The  marginal  efficiency  cost  per  unit  of revenue  is  obtained  by the  ratio
of these  two  expressions:
(5) NEC  (r*  - r)[-D'(r)/D(r)]
1  - (r*  - r)[D'(r)/D(r)]
Note that  the  term  -D' is  positive  since  D' has  a negative  sign. As
expected,  the  marginal  efficiency  cost  increases  with the interest  gap  r*-r,
and  with the  response  -D
When the demand  for  financial  assets  is of the  form (1),  the  expression
(5)  becomes
(6)  NEC - 1  (r*-r)a
Empirical  Estimates
The  discussion  in Section  III  showed  that  when the  level  of taxation  is
low,  there  is little  observed  impact  on the  level  of financial  assets. This
may  be because  of the  noise  of other  determinants  of financial  deepening,  or
because  of the  effect  is  genuinely  weak.  However,  we have seen  that  for  the
countries  with  high taxation,  the  effect  is strong. The  measurements  of
Section  III  can  now  be used in  formula  (5)  to evaluate  the  marginal  efficiency
cost.  The  results  are  presented  in  Table  4 for  the  three  countries  with  high
20This formula  is an approximation  since  it is derived  by a simplified
partial  equilibrium  analysis. For  small  tax  rates,  this  formula  may  be a good
approximation  of the  efficiency  cost  of inflation  in general  equilibrium,
(Chamley  [1985]).-40-
inflation.  These  numbers  are  complemented  with  others  from  a  previous  study
on  financial  liberalization  in  South  East  Asia 21.
The  values  of  the  efficiency  cost  depend  on  the  assumption  about  the
inflation  rate  (in  the  first  column).  They  are  higher  than  those  that  are
obtained  by  estimation  of  the  demand  for  money  (transaction)  in  industrialized
economies  (Cagan  [1956]).  This  properties  was  discussed  already  in  Section
III.
Table  4  The  Efficiency  Cost  of  TAxatiQn
Country  Inflation  Rate  MEC
Somalia  60%  .43
Zaire  60%  .43
100%  1.0
200%  Z
Thailand  5%  a/  .58
Indonesia  13% a/  1.19
Notes:
All  values  are  in  percentage  points.
a/ This  value  is  the  difference  between  the  average  real  rats
before  and  after  the  liberalizations.  (For  more  discussion  see
Chamley  and  Qaizar,  [1989]).
Comparison  with  the  Cross-Section  Evidence








The  values  of the  efficiency  cost  that  are  obtained  here are  smaller  than
what was indicated  by the  cross-section  analysis. Note  that in the  cross-
section,  there  was hardly  any gain  of revenues  when the inflation  rate  ranged
between  50 and  100  percent,  which  is the  relevant  intererval  for the  three
countries. Indeed,  there  are some  good  reasons  to  believe  that the  time
series  results  underestimate  the  true  elasticities  in developing  economies
where  a process  of financial  deepening  is  stopped  by high inflation.
In the  sub-saharan  countries  with  moderate  and low  inflation,  financial
deepening  (as  measured  by the  ratio  between  financial  assets  and  GDP)
progressed  gradually  since  the  early  1970. The growth  of saving  and time
deposits  was important  in  this  process  and required  an environment  of
stability. There  are  some fixed  costs  associated  to the  development  of the
financial  sector. In an environment  of high taxes,  there  is no growth  of
financial  assets  for  a saving  purpose,  and  the  money  in  circulation  is  used
mainly  for  transaction. This  motive  is less  sensitive  to the  rate  of return
on  money (currency  to  GDP ratios  are  typically  not  very sensitive  to inflation
rates  in the  range  of 40 to 60  percent). One can  therefore  expect  that  time
series  estimates  will show  relatively  low  interest  elasticities  of the  demand
for  money.  The  problem  here is that  models  of linear  equations  such  as (1)
may be somewhat  deficient  for  economies  which  undergo  the  structural  changes
associated  with economic  development.
This  discussion  implies  that  the  values  of  Table  4 should  thus  be
regarded  as conservative  estimates.
V.l.b  lnterest  Ceilings  and  Allocations  in  Credit  Markets-43-
Interest  ceilings  have two  effects  on credit  markets,  discriminations
against  risky  investment  projects,  and rationing. As the interest  ceiling  is
lowered  gradually  from  the  market  equilibrium  rate,  the  first  effect  occurs
immediately. The second  effect  does  not  occur  at the  same  time.
Risky  r'oiects  are discriminated  against  because  the  ceilings  apply
uniformly  to loans  in  all  projects  and  do  not  make allowance  for  the  risk
premium  and  different  probabilities  of default. The effect  1s  very similar  to
that  of the  corporate  tax in the  standard  Harberger  model  where  a fixed  amount
of capital  is allocated  between  two  sectors. When  this  effect  occurs,  lenders
allocate  funds  on the  margin  to the  riskless  sector,  (where  the  rate  of return
is  equal  to the  ceiling). There  is  no general  rationing,  although  some  of the
more risky  sectors  may  be excluded  because  they  are  beyond  the  margin. The
implication  of the  flarberger  model  is that  the  efficiency  cost  is only  of the
second  order  with respect  to the  implicit  tax  rate.
When the  ceiling  is  sufficiently  low,  or all  projects  identical,
rationing  may occur. This  rationing  creates  rents  and  may lead  to  an
inappropriate  allocation  of the  available  funds. The  maximum  efficiency  cost
of the  rationing  is thus  represented  by the  area  ABCD in Figure  5.  In
general,  there  is  no good  information  for  a  more  precise  evaluation  of this
cost. However,  as an important  property,  it is  of the  first  order  with
respect  to the  interest  wedge.
The  previous  analysis  applied  to an economy  where  the  alternative  to
money  holding  is to invest  in  activities  without  distortions,  i.e.,  where  the-44-
private  rate of return  is equal  to the  social  rate of return. This  assumption
may  not  be valid in  many cases,  but there  are  only few  cases  where the  nature
of this  distortion  can  be defined  explicitly  and  evaluated  for  policy
analysiL. In one  important  case  however  such  an analysis  can  be provided. We
have noted  already  that  for  various  reasons,  capital  markets  are subject  to
imperfections  in developing  economies. As Shaw  has pointed  a long  time  ago,  a
consequence  of these  imperfections  is that  the  purchase  of investment  goods
(or  any  bulky  item  such as  durables)  requires  the  accumulation  of cash
balances  prior to the  purchase  of the  good. This  is  especially  true  in  an
economy  without  credit,  but even  when credit  is available,  the  bank may
finance  only  a fraction  of the  investment,  and the  rest  is financed  by the
accumulation  of cash  balances 22.
Consider  the  problem  of an investor  that  has  no access  to credit  and  has
a positive  cash-flow  that  is saved  in  money  for  the  purchase  of a durable
good.  The  real  value  of this  flow  is assumed  to  be constant. Assume  for
simplicity  that  in an initial  environment,  there  is  no inflation  and that  the
rate  of return  on deposit  is  nil.  Now the  inflation  rate  takes  a positive
value.  Inflation  acts like  a tax  on the  durable  good,  and increases  its
effective  cost.  More remarkably,  inflation  will lead  to  an increase  of the
average  level  of the  cash  balance  at every  moment  before  the  purchase 23.
22Real goods  provide  an alternative  to cash  balances  but this  is  probably
an ineffective  method  of saving  because  of transaction  costs.
23  This  can  be seen  by a recursive  argument: assume  that  time is  divided
into  periods,  and that  the  cash-flow  accrues  at the  end  of the  period,  In the
last  period  of the  saving  process,  the  purchase  is  made and  its  value  is equal
to the  sum  of the  cash-flow  in that  period  and  the  deposit  balance  at the  end
of the  period. Inflaticn  erodes  the  deposit  balances  and thus  requires  .
higher  level  of the  balance  at the  beginning  of the  last  period  (in  order  to
have the  same  real  balance  at the  end  of the  period  when  the  purchase  is
made). A recursive  argument  is then  applied  to all  periods  during  the
accumulation  process. Note that  the  length  of that  process  may increase.-45-
This  theoretical  argument  is  not in contradiction  with the  observable
behavior  of the  velocity  of  money  in sub-saharan  countries. We have seen  that
in countries  with temporary  episodes  of significant  inflation  (such  as Nigeria
or Zambia  before  1986),  there  is not  clear  relation  between  the  level  of  money
holdings  and inflation.
Even  when inflation  does  not induce  a  lower  level  of money  balances,  it
increases  the  cost  of holding  money,  and  the  cost  of investment  and  durable
goods. The  estimation  of this  excess-burden  may  not  be done  with the  tools  of
supply  and demand of money balances, since it depends on inefficiencies that
arise  in other  markets. The only  conclusion  here is that  the  values  of
efficiency  costs  in table  4 are  underestimates  of the  true  values.
V.2.  ImRact  on LongeRun  Growth
The  argument  that  a reduction  of the  tax  on financial  institutions
stimulates  investment  and  growth  is  appealing  and  has often  been  mentioned;  to
be effective,  it needs  to be buttressed  by some  numbers. What is the
potential  for growth  that  can  be delivered  by a reduction  of the  tax  burden  on
financial  absets? After  the  financial  liberalizations  of Thailand  and
Indonesia  (Chamley  and  Husain [1989]),  most of the  growth  of financial  assets
seems  to  have been generated  by substitutions  from  the  foreign  and  the
parallel  markets.  It did  not appear  that  this  growth  was due to an increase-46-
of the saving  rate (which  in this  case  would  have had to increase  by 5
points) 24.
Can  a  weak relation  between  the  rate  of return  and saving  be explained  by
economic  theory  ?  Yes, and  there  are  two  arguments:  we all  know that  the
impact  of the  oy_eral  rate  of return  on the  level  of saving  is ambiguous
because  of the  opposite  substitution  and  income  effects. Second,  financial
assets  form  only  a fraction  of total  saving,  and  an increase  of their  rate  of
return  has only  a limited  impact  on the  overall  Intertemporal  rate  of return.
Assume  for  example  that  the  level  of financial  savings  is equal  to one third
of one  year's  output. If capital  is two  years  output  (a  low  number),
financial  savings  is  one sixth  of wealth. An increase  of the  real  rate  of
return  on deposits  of 12  points  (a  large  number  for  the  liberalizations  in
South  East  Asia)  would  induce  an increase  of the  overall  rate  of return  of
only 2  points. Such  a computation  is  obviously  a bit rough,  but its  main
purpose  is to  put these  effects  in  perspective.
Let  us make now  the  extreme  assumption  for  growth  that  indeed,  all  new
financial  assets  come  from  an increase  of the  flow  of saving. The impact  of
this  expansion  on output  depend  on the  rate  of return  to capital. This  point
is obvious,  has  been  used since  cost-benefit  exists,  but it tends  to  be a
little  overlooked  in these  days  of endogenous  growth  models.
Assume  for  example,  that  the  real  marginal  productivity  of capital  is
equal  to 25 percent  (a  relatively  large  number). If financial  deepening
increases  from  say  25 percent  of GDP to 50  percent  (again  not a  small  effect),
2 4There  is  by now  a well  known  controversy  about  the  impact  of interest
rates  in financial  markets  on the  level  of aggregate  saving. See  Giovannini
[1985],  for the  lack  of relation,  and  Fry [1988],  for  the  opposite  view.-47-
the  increase  of  output  (after  five  years)  is  equal  to  .25  multiplied  by .25,
i.e.  6.25  percent  of  GDP,  which  corresponds  to  an  increase  of  the  growth  rate
of  GDP  of  1.5  percent,  per  annum,  for  five  years.  This  is  not  negligible,  but
still  seems  short  of  a true  "take-off".  In  a standard  growth  model,  the
impact  on  growth  is  transitory,  and  the  impact  on  the  level  of  the  balanced
growth  path  is  permanent.
A new  literature  has  emerged  recently  to  diverge  from  the  Solovian
framework  of  diminishing  returns  which  imposed  an  exogenous  constraint  on  the
rate  of  growth 25. These  works  have  been  motivated  by  various  types  of
empirical  stylized  facts  which  do  not  seem  to  fit  the  Solow  model.  Mechanisms
that  are  independent  from  each  other  have  been  proposed  to  explain  an
endogenous  determination  of  the  growth  rate.  A complete  discussion  is  c  of
place  here,  and  I  will  focus  briefly  on  the  relation  between  non  human  capital
accumulation  and  growth,  which  is  the  issue  in  this  paper.
Tho  standard  mechanism  Zor  endogenous  growth  here  is  to  assume  that  there
are  no  diminishing  returns  in  production.  We  all  know  that  there  are
diminishing  returns  at  the  firm  level.  The  constant  returns  at  the  aggregate
level  are  justified  by  externalities  between  capital  inputs  (or  output)  in  the
economy.  Such  process  have  not  been  supported  yet  by  hard  empirical
evidence 26. The  property  is  represented  by  atn  aggregate  production  function
of  the  type
25Such  models  are  not  completely  new  since  they  existed  at  least  since
the  model  of  learning  by  doing  of  Arrow. See  Romer  [1986]  for  an
introduction,  and  Easterly  (1989]  for  policy  implications.
26For  a  sceptical  view  about  this  process  of  endogenous  growth,  see  the
empirical  study  of  Benhabib  and  Jovanovic  [1989].-4P.-
(7)  Y  A-  #,
where  A is a constant,  and 0 is an efficiency  parameter  that  depends  on
policy. The  growth  rate  of the  economy  g, is equal  to that  of capital  which
is given  by the  equation
(8)  g  K  - Y  sA0  ,  where  s  is  the  saving  rate.
The  growth  rate  now  depends  on  s  and  0;  policies  that  affect  the  saving
rate  or  the  efficiency  of  the  economy  lead  to  a  higher  growth  rate. Note  that
this  effect  applies  to  ang  policy  that  improves  the  efficiency  of  the  economy,
however  trivial  the  improvement  may  be.
The  crucial  assumption  here  is  the  constant  returns  to  scale  in  capital.
It  does  not  invalidate  the  use  of  the  standard  tools  of  cost-benefit:  The
constant  returns  to  scale  in  capital  imply  that  for  the  aggregate,  the
marginal  return  of  capital  is  equal  to  the  average  return.  Empirical
estimates  of  the  ratio  between  output  and  capital  are  relatively  high,  more
than  30  percent 27. It  is  not  surprising  that  such  high  numbers  would  indeed
lead  to  very  large  benefits  of  the  growth  of  capital  stock  through  financial
deepening.  The  main  conclusion  here  is  that  the  evidence  about  a "linchpin'
impact  of  financial  taxation  on  growth  needs  to  rely  on  a  good  micro-economic
model  which  is  supported  by  data  on  very  large  rates  of  return  of  investment
or  externalities  in  the  growth  process.
271f  this  ratio  is  taken  for  the  "new"  sector  in  developing  economy,  it
would  be approximated  by  the  inverse  of  the  ICOR.-49-
FIGURE  6a. The  Expansion  of  Bank  Deposits  in
Thailand
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VI.  CONCLUSION:  FINANCIAL  LIBERALIZATION  AND RECOVERY
As a high level  of taxation  induces  a  strong  reduction  of the  level  of
financial assets, its removal will lead to a large expansion of financial
intermediation.  Experiences  of financial  liberalization  have  been analyzed  in
numerous  previous  studies 28, and  a discussion  is limited  here  by space.  In
view of the  results  of this  paper,  one  point  needs  to  be stressed  :  in order
to  be successful,  a  liberalization  must  be characterized  by a  credible  policy.
Failing  this  criterion,  the  removal  of taxes  cannot  be anticipated  to  be
permanent  and  will  have  a limited  impact  on financial  expansion.
Two examples  of successful  liberalization  occurred  in  Thailand  and
Indonesia,  after  1980. These  are illustrated  by Figures  6a and  b.  In  both
cases  the  rate  of inflation  was low  because  of sound  macroeconomic  policies.
The removal  of interest  ceilings  was crucial  for  the  large  expansions  of
financial  assets,  mainly  through  inflowc  from  other  markets  (informal  and
foreign).
This removal  of interest  ceilings  which is  so important  in stable  macro-
economic  environments  (with  strong  possibilities  of substitution  in informal
and foreign  markets),  is  probably  not the  essential  step  when the  taxation  of
financial  assets  is due  to internal  imbalances.  The liberalization  in the
Philippines  (Figure  6c)  is a case  in  point:  interest  rates  were increased,  but
when inflation  soared,  the  negative  real  rate  on assets  stopped  domestic
financial  deepening. A hasty  removal  of interest  rate  ceilings  which  precedes
28See  Fry [1988],  Chamley  and  Husain  [1989].-52-
economic  stabilization  may in fact  hamper  the  success  of liberalization.  This
removal  increases  the  burden  of the  debt  for  the  government  and the  additional
burden  may  endanger  a program  towards  stability. This  argument  is developed
more fully  in  Appendix  2.
The  structure  of markets  is  somewhat  different  in Sub-Sahara,  but similar
lessons  can  be used:  high inflation  rates  were  stopped  in  Ghar.a  after  the
introduction  of a  program  of structural  adjustment  in 1984. However,  macro-
economic  stability  was  not  fulJj  restored  and  the inflation  rate  still  reached
40 percent  in 1987.  Al.though  (nominal)  interest  rates  were  had increased  up
to 25  percent,  the  real  rate  of return  was still  negative. This  uncertainty
seems  to  have contributed  to a very  slow  financial  deepening  since  1984 (by  3
percentage  points  between  1984  and  1987). More  work  needs  to  be done  on these
issues  but since  heavy  financial  taxation  is  often  the  result  of  budget
deficiencies,  it is hardly  a  surprise  that  these  structural  issues  should  be
addressed  for  a durable  recovery.-53-
APPENDIX  1
Computation  of Seianorage  Revenues
In order  to analyze  the  biases  that  occur  when inflation  is  not constant,
divide  one  year in two  periods  of six  months. Call  y the real  annual  GDP.
Assume  that  the  flow  of real  GDP  is constant  over  the  year,  and that  the  money
growth  occurs  only in the  second  half  of the  year.  The formula  (4)  becomes
AM  AK
(9)Z-  Z  1  _ 
2  2~~~~~
where P is an average  price  index  over  the  second  half  of the  year.
The  actual  amount  of revenues  as a fraction  of real  GDP,  are  equal  to
(10)  R  l AM y  P*
where  P* is  an average  of the  price  level  over the  second  half of the
year.  The indices  P  and P* are  not  exactly  the  same,  but they  are  averages
of  price  levels  over the  same  half-year. The  comparison  between  the  two
formulae  (9)  and (10)  shows  that  the first  overestimates  the  true  amount  of
revenues: The  money is  expanded  in  the  second  half-year,  and  the  deflator  for
the  real revenues  of money  should  thus  be for  the  same  half-year,  as shown  in
formula  (10).  But  the first  formula  includes  the  prices  of the  first  half-
year (which  are lower)  in  the  computation  of the  deflator,  thus  generating  a
positive  bias.-54-
Note that  in this  example,  one  would  expect  the  velocity  of  money  to
increase  in the  second  half-year  (since  inflation  incr-ases). This  effect
would induce  a higher  price  increase  in that  half-period,  and  thus  exacerbate
the  previous  effect. The  argument  applies  mutatls  mutandis  when the  rate  of
money  creation  decelerates.
The  sensitivity  of the  error  to the  behavior  of the  rate  of  money
creation  or the  velocity  of  money  is tested  in  Table  1 under  the  following
assumptions. The  year is  divided  in 12  months. The rate  of money  creation  is
equal  to zero in the  first  half  of the  year  and then  equal  to 6  percent  per
month.  The  velocity  of  money  is  constant  in case  I,  and such  that  the  money
to (annual)  GDP  ratio  is  equal  to  25 percent. In the  second  case the  velocity
of money  increases  by 40 percent  during  the  second  half of the  year.
Since  the  bias has the  other  sign  when the  the  rate  of money  decelerates,
the  formula  (4)  could  provide  a  good  measure  on average. This is tested  here
by assuming  that  the  money  creation  is  equal  to zero  and 6  percent  (per
months)  in alternate  months  (with  constant  and  changing  velocities  of money).
These  are the  cases  III  and  IV of the  Table,  respectively.
Finally,  the  case  V shows  the  results  when the  money  growth  rate is  equal
to zero  and  6 percent  in alternate  months,  and the  velocity  increases  lag
systematically  one  months  behind  the  money  expansions. One  can see  that  the
bias can  be very sensitive  to the  structure  of lags  between  money  and  price
expansions.-55-
TABLE  2
EXAMPLES  OF COMPUTATION  OF SEIGNORAGE  REVENUES
AH/M  inf  R/y  Meas.  1  Meas.  2
(1)  (2)  (3)  (5)  (4)
I  42  42  8.4  9.6  9.3
(13%)  (10%)
II  42  56  7.7  9.6  8.8
(51%)  (15%)
III  42  70  7  13.2  8.4
(87%)  (19%)
IV  42  84  6.5  14.5  8.0
(123%)  (23%)
V.  1039  2405  6.1  7.7
(26%)
(6.5%)*
All  numbers  are in  percentages.
Refin-itions
I to IV.  The  money  growth  is  equal  to 0 % in the  first  six  months  of one
year,  and to 6% (per  month)  in  the  second  half of the  year.  The  velocity  of
money is  constant  in the  first  half of the  year.  It  increases  in the  second
hAlf of the  year  by C% (I),  10% (II),  20% (II),  and 320%  (III).
IV.  In six  consecutive  years,  money  growth  is  equal  to 50  percent  per
year,  and  all the  growth  occurs  in the  second  half of each  year.  Before  the
first  increase  the  velocity  is equal  to the  base case (say  100  - in fact  3.3
when GDP is  computed  on an annual  basis). After the  first  increase  of  money,
velocity  increases  to 120,  until  the  next  money  expansion  when it increases  to
140,  and  so on up to a  value  of 220.
The  value  of R/y is the  value  of the  standard  formula  averaged  over the
six  years.  The  computation  for  Methods  on and  two (see  the  text),  are  in the
last two  columns. The  errors  with respect  to the  true  value (in  percent.ge)
are in  parenthesis.-56-
*  This  number  refers  to the  error  (in  percentage),  when the  standard
formula  is applied  to the  whole  span  of six  years  and is defined  by
REV  - (M6 -MO)/(Yl + ...  +Y 6
where  Yi is the  nominal  GDP in  year i.
Other  Fancil  ARsts
The  previous  discussion  applies  to the  other  items  of the  base for
financial  taxation. When  the  asset  pays interest  income,  the  amouat  of cash
revenues  is  equal  to the  difference  between  (i)  expansion  of the  nominal
quantity  of the  asset  (such  as demand  or time  deposit),  deflated  by a  price
index,  and (ii)  the  nominal  interest  income  of the  asset:
(11)  R  AN  p  iM
or as a fraction  of real  GDP,
(12)  R  M - iM y
This  formula  is subject  to the  same  caveat  as the  one  for  seigniorage.
Its is  straightforward  when the  menu of deposit  and  of interest  rates  is
simple.  This  is the  case  of the  sub-saharan  countries  between  1980  and 1986:
demand  deposits  did  not  earn  an interest  income,  and  the  interest  rate  on time
leposits  was almost  constant  for  most  countries. The relevant  data  for
countries  that  have  used a  inflation  tax (with  a  rate  higher  than  20 percent
on average  between  1980  and  1986)  is  presented  in  Table  3.-57-
APPENDIX  2
Interest WUl  And  StabLilzation
The  argument  of the  previous  section  applies  in  a  world  which  is
stationary  and  where  the  policy  goal  is to extract  a steady  flow  of revenues
from  the  financial  sector  by the  least  inefficient  method. It does  not take
into  account  the  context  in  which  the  taxation  of financial  assets  becomes  an
important  source  of revenue  for  a government. In the  sub-saharan  countries
that  have  not  been subject  to policy  restrictions  such  as in the  CFA zone,  the
revenues  from  the  taxation  on financial  assets  has  been subject  to large
fluctuations.
Stylized  features  of financial  taxations  in fiscal  crises  are  that  they
occur  discontinuously:  in  normal  periods  the  government  is able  to  meet its
obligations  through  standard  taxes,  and the  tax  burden  of the  financial  sector
is  low.  The financial  assets  form  a  base that  is  easy to tax. Furthermore
this  taxation  is efficient  in the  short-run  because  it is  per  se  equivalent  to
a lump-sum  tax.  However,  a tax  on financial  assets  may  have also  a  strong
effect  on financial  saving  in the  future  even if the  government  never  expects
to repeat  this  tax.  The taxation  of financial  institutions  often  carries  with
it the  signal  that  such  policy  will  be repeated  in  the  future  (consider
Ghana). This  signalling  effect  has  prevented  many governments  from imposing
capital  levies  on the  financial  sector.
The first  effect  of a fiscal  crisis  is  an  increase  of the  quantity  of
money  and  of the inflation  rate.  The  anticipation  of this  event  induces  an
increase  of the  nominal  interest  rate,  which in  turn  means  a  higher  debt-58-
service  for  the  government. It is in this  context  that  interest  ceilings  can
provide  a  useful  instrument  for  policy.
To present  the  argument  we can  observe  that in  a  situation  of free
market,  the interest  elasticity  of the  demand  for  deposits  (the  supply  of
funds  at  banks),  is lower  than  the  interest  elasticity  of  the  demand  for
government  loans  by banks. This fact  is supported  by theoretical  reasoning
and empirical  evidence. To sfmplify  the  discussion,  we can  emphasize  this  by
assuming  that  the  supply  of deposits  by individuals  is fixed  and independent
of the (expected)  inflation  rate.
In this  simple  framework,  there  is  no uncertainty  except  that  presented
by the inflation  policy  of the  government; therefore  in a free  market  banks
should  lend  to the  government  and  the  private  borrowers  at the  same interest
rate. Assume  now that  banks  and  borrowers  (entrepreneurs)  both expect  a
financial  crisis  to occur  next  year  with  a probability  s, and that  if a crisis
occurs,  the  inflation  rate is  equal  to w.  In  a free  market  the  nominal  one
year interest  rate  is then  equal  to the  sum  of the  real  rate  r* and of the
product sw:  i  - r* + s8.  In  particular,  this  is the  interest  rate  that the
government  has to pay on its  debt (next  year). One  could  argue  that  a higher
interest  on the  debt  is not inefficient  since  it  represents  a transfer  between
individuals.  However,  the  debt  service  is financed  taxes  which  entail  a
social  cost  because  of price  distortions  and  administration.
A solution  to this  problem  is to impose  a ceiling  equal  to r* on nominal
interest  rates. This  policy  is  not  a cure  to the  problem  of time-consistency
because  it  does  not force  a government  to  be honest  (i.e.  not to  use inflation
next year). The interest  ceiling  is a device  that  forces  individuals  to
behave  as if they  believed  that  the  government  is  honest.-59-
What  are the  implications  of the  policy  for  the  loan  market? The supply
of funds  for  private  borrowers  is  equal  to  the  difference  between  deposits  and
government  bonds. Assume  first  that  there  is  no government  intervention.  The
nominal  interest  rate  is equal  to i  - r*  +  sw.  When the  government  puts a
ceiling  equal  to r* on the  nominal  rate,  the  expected  real  cost  of funds  for
borrowers  is equal  to r*-sx.  The demand  for  loans  increases; since  the
supply  is fixed,  rationing  occurs. The effects  of this  rationing  on
efficiency  depend  on its  mechanism. In the  present  model  with no uncertainty,
borrowers  may  use resources  to  capture  the  rationing  rents. The  maximum
amount  of rent  seeking  is equal  to the  product  of the  interest  gap sw and  of
the  amount  of loans  to the  private  sector,  L.  Note  however  that this  is  an
upper  bound  of the  cost  and  that  other  rationing  rules  could  lead  to  much
smaller  costs.
The efficiency  gain  of the  ceiling  is  equal  to the  product  swGv,  where  G
is the  level  of the  government  debt  and  v is the  efficiency  cost  of taxation.
The  comparison  of the  benefits  and  the  cost  shows  that  the  policy  may  be
efficient  even  is  private  borrowers  spend  all  possible  resources  to  attempt  to
capture  the  rationing  rents. A sufficient  condition  for  efficiency  in  this
case is that  the  product  of the  marginal  efficiency  cost  of taxation  and  of
the  government  debt is  greater  than  the  level  of private  loans. This is  a
realistic  situation:  for  example,  is  the  the  marginal  efficiency  cost  of
taxation  has the  plausible  value  of 50  percent,  the  interest  ceiling  is
efficient  when the  government  borrowing  from  financial  institutions  is at
least  equal  to twice  the  amount  of private  loans.
The analysis  can  be extended  to  an economy  with  micro-risks. In  such  an
economy,  the  ceiling  implies  a distortion  because  it reduces  the  incentive  for-60-
loans  to risky  projects  (Section  IV.l.c). The  magnitude  of this  effect
depends  on the  return  properties  of each  project  and  on the  distribution  of
these  projects. An upper  bound  for  the  social  efficiency  cost is  given  again
by  product  swL  which  is the  same  expression  as in the  previous  case.  The
comparison  between  the  benefits  and the  costs  of the  policy  follows  in  the
same  way.-61-
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